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This paper considers two person zero-sum sequential games with 
finite state and action spaces. We consider the pair of functional equations 
(f.e.) that arises in the undiscounted infinite stage model, and show that 
a certain class of successive approximation schemes is guaranteed to con-
verge to a solution pair whenever a stationary ~quilibrium policy with 
respect to the average return per unit time criterion (AEP) exists. Exis-
tence of the latter thus implies the existence of a solution to this pair 
of f.e. whereas the converse implication is shown only to hold under special 
circumstances. 
In addition to this pair of f. e., a cor,~plete sequence of f. e. has 
to be considered when analyzing more sensitive optimality criteria that 
make further selections within the class of AEPs. A number of characteri-
zations and interdependences between the existence of solutions to the 
f.e. and existence of stationary sensitive optimal equilibrium policies 
are obtained. 
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O. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
This paper considers two-person zero-sum Stochastic Renewal Games 
(SRG's) with finite state space n = {1, ••• ,N} and in each state i En, two 
finite sets K(i) and L(i) of actions available to player 1 and 2 resp. 
We speak of a state as being observed for only an instant. The moment 
state i is observed, the two players choose an action, or a randomization 
of actions out.of K(i) and L(i) resp. When the actions k E K(i), and 
l E L(i) are chosen in state i, then 
(1) the probability 
given by P~~l;;:: 
l.J 
that state j is the next state to be observed, is 
N kl 
0 (~. 1 P. ~ = 1) l J= l.J 
(2) the period of time until the next observation of time, is a random 
variable t, with conditional probability distribution function F~:l(.) 
l.J 
given that j is the next state of the system 
(3) for each x ;;:: o, Rk,:t(x) denotes the expected income earned by player 
frore player 2, 
l.~ 
during the first x units of time, given that state j 
is the next state of the system and t;;:: x. 
The discrete time case, where each transition takes exactly one unit of 
time, is known as the stochastic games-model (cf. e.g. [14],[18]) and 
will be denoted as the SDG-case. When one of the two players has only 
one action in each state of the system, the SRG and SDG model reduce to 
a Markov Renewal Program, (MRP) and pure Markov Decision Problem (MDP) resp. 
If the payoffs are discounted at the interest rater> O, the SRG-game 
is called the r-discount game. Let V(r) denote the vector the s-th compo-
nent of which indicates the value of the r-discount game with initial 
states En. The existence of a value for the r-discount game goes back 
to SHAPLEY [ 18]. 
In a recent paper, BEWLEY and KOHLBERG [2] gave a description of 
the asymptotic behaviour of V(r), as the interest rater decreases to 
zero, by deriving a series expansion of V(r), for all r sufficiently small. 
When there is no reason to discount future rewards, or whenever the infi-
nite stage game model serves as an approximation to the model where the 
planning horizon is finite though large, the average return per unit time 
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criterion, in one of its possible ,specifications (cf. BEWLEY and KOHLBERG 
[3]) is the first criterion to be considered. 
It is known from GILLETTE [8] that one or both players may fail to 
have equilibrium policies with respect to the average retum per unit 
time criterion (AEPs). Recurrency conditions with respect to the transi-
tion probability matrices (tpms) associated with the stationary policies 
have been found under which the existence of an AEP is guaranteed for 
each possible combination of rewards. (cf. HOFFMANN and KARP [9], 
SOBEL [20], ROGERS [15], STERN [21] and FEDERGRUEN [6]. 
In this paper we show that in undiscounted SRG's, a pair of functio-
nal vector equations arises which is the natural analogue of the corres-
ponding ones in Markov Decision Theory (cf. [5],[11],[17]). We show that, 
in complete analogy to the structure of MRP's, the existence of a solution 
to this pair of functional equations is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a. s.tationary AEP. 
We give a constructive proof, showing that a specific class of 
successive approximation schemes converges to a solution of this pair of 
functional equations (f.e.) 
For the case where the optimal average retum per unit time is 
independent of the initial state of the system, these successive approxi~ 
mation schemes .provide an algorithm to locate AEPs whenever existing, as 
is pointed out in FEDERGRUEN [7]. Conversely and in contrast with what is 
known to be the case in ordinary MRP's, it is shown that the existence 
of a fixed point of the pair of functional equations only needs to be 
sufficient for the existence of an AEP when the asymptotic average value 
(cf. section 2) is independent of the initial state of the system. 
This is explained by showing that a pair of policies which satisfies 
the two optimality equations for some solution pair, is merely guaran-
teed to meet some partial optimality result (cf. prop. 2,4). 
The above results are obtained in section 2, after giving the 
notation in section 1. 
In section 3, we give some properties of the optimality equations, 
both for the general multichain and for the unichain-case. Since only 
the tails of the streams of rewards matter when considering the average 
return per unit time criterion, mor,e sensitive optimality criteria are 
needed to make further selections within the class of AEPs. As a conse-
quence, we next consider the extension to the S.RG-model of the sensitive 
discount and cumulative average optimality criteria that have been 
formulated and studied in the literature on MDPs (cf. MILLER and VEINOTT 
[13], VEINOTT [22], SLADKY [19]; DENARDO [4] e.a:) In section 4, we 
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show that in addition to the above mentioned pair of f.e. an entire 
sequence of co~pled f.e. arises when considering these sensitive optima-
lity criteria. We prove that this sequence has a solution when all of the 
tpm's associated with the pure stationary policies are unichained. 
Moreover, we extend the results obtained for the average return per unit 
time criterion to the entire set of sensitive optimality criteria. 
I. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES 
For each finite set A, let IIAII denote the number of elements it 
contains. En denotes then-dimensional Euclidean space. If A= [A .. ] 
1] 
is a matrix, let I Al = max .. jA .. j, and let val A indicate the value of 
1,J 1] 
the corresponding matrix game. Note that for any pair of matrices A,B of 
equal dimension 
(I.I) !val A - val Bj s IA-Bl 
(Let (xA,yA) and (xB,yB) be equilibrium pairs of actions in the matrix 
games A and B; then min .. (A .. -B .. ) s xB (A-B)yA s xB AyA - xB ByA s 
A B 1 'J A iJ B iJ A B 
val A - val B s x Ay - x By s x (A-B)y s max .. (A .. -B .. )). 
1,J 1] 1] 
1 K ( . ) = { E II K ( i ) II j > O \"' II K ( i ) II = I } For each state i E Q, et 1 x E x - , lk=l xk 
de.note the set of all randomized actions available to player I in state 
. . ·1 1 L(') { IIL(i)II I O \IIL(i)II l} . d" h 
1. S1m1 ar y, 1 = y E E y <:": , lf=I Y,e_ = in 1cates t e 
set of all randomized actions available to player 2 in state i E Q. 
kl For every i En, any tableau of numbers [c.' ], k = l, ... ,IIK(i)II; 
1 
l ~ l, ... ,IIL(i)II and for each pair of closed convex subsets K(i) S K(i) 
and L(i) s L(i), we denote by 
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( 1 . 2) 
[ k,lJ 
(K(i) ,I(i) J Ci 
the two-person zero-sum game which has K(i) and L(i) as. the action sets 
for player 1 and 2 resp. and where the payoff to player 1, is given by 
\IIK(i)II \IIL(i)II ck,l . , 
lk=1 lf=1 ~. i Y,e_ 
when the players choose action x E K(i) and y E L(i) resp. The minimax 
value of this game is~indicated by val[K(i),L(i)J[c~'l]. kl 
When K(i) = K(i) and L(i) = L(i) we use the abbreviated notation [c.' ] 
l. 
to indicate the game in (1.1). The following lennna is immediate from 
KARLIN ([12], pp. 63): 
LEMMA 1. 1. Fi:x i E Q. Let K(i) and L(i) be closed convex polyhedral 
subsets of K(i) and L(i). Then the sets of optimal actions in any one 
of the tvo-pe.r>son ze.r>o-sum games in ( 1. I) are again closed convex poly-
hedral subsets of K(i) and L(i) and thus of K(i) and L(i). 
A player's policy is a rule which prescribes for each stage 
t = 1,2, •.. which (randomized) action to choose in dependence on the 
current state and the entire history of the game up to that stage. A 
policy is said to be stationary, if it prescribes actions which depend 
merely upon the current state of the system, regardless of the stage of 
the game, and its history up to this stage. Note that a stationary stra-
tegy f (h) for player I (2) is characterized by a tableau [fik] ([hi,e_J) 
satisfying fik 2 0 and IkEK(i) fik = 1 (hik 2 0 and l,e_EL(i) hil = 1), 
where fik(hil) is the probability that the k-th (l-th) alternative is 
chosen when entering state i E Q. We let 1?('±') denote the set of all statio-
nary policies for player 1 (2). 
When a positive interest rater is introduced into the model, 
-rt . income earned at time tis discounted by the factor e . When in state 
i, the players choose action k E K(i) and l E L(i), the one-step expected 
r-discounted reward for player is given by: 
oo X 
( 1 . 3) I I 
0 0 
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1' • • -
l.J f x d < 00 
0 
denote the expected aonditionaZ holding time in state i, when the players 
choose actions k E K(i), l E L(i) and given that the next state observed 
is state j. Likewise, let 
denote the expected unaonditionaZ holding time in state i, when k E K(i), 
and l E L(i) are the actions chosen, and assume T~,l > 0 
]. 
(i En, k E K(i), l E L(i)). 
Associated with each pair (f,h) E ~ x o/ are N-component reward 
vector q(f,h), holding time vector T(f,h), and the matrices P(f,h) 
and H(f,h): 
q(f,h). = I I fik 0 k,l hil q. . ]. kEK(i) lEL(i) ]. 
; i € Q 
T(f,h). = I I T~'l. ]. 
kEK(i) lEL(i) fik 0 hil ]. ; i € Q 
"'p(f,h) .. = I I fik 0 P~!l. hil l.J k l l.J 
; i'". j €- n 
H(f,h) .. = I I fik 0 H~!l. hil l.J k l l.J 
i, j E n. 
For any pair (f,h) E ~ x o/ define the stochastic matrix TI(f,h) as the 
n oo 
Cesaro limit of the sequence {P (f,h)}n=l. Denote by n(f,h) the number 
of subchains (closed, irreducible sets of states) for P(f,h) and let 
R(f,h) = {i E Q I TI(f,h) .. > O} i.e. R(f,h) is the set of recurrent states 
].]. 
for P(f,h). 
We then have: 
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(1. 5) II(f,h) .. = \n(fl,h) ~~(f',h). ,r~(f,h) 
iJ Lin= i J 
where ,rm(f,h) is the 
mth subchain Cm(f,h) 
unique equilibrium distribution of P(f,h) on the 
and ~~(f,h) is the probability of absorption in 
i 
Cm(f,h), starting from state i En. Observe that l~=l ,r~(f,h) = 1 and 
•·m m 
~ (f,h) P(f,h) = ,r (f,h). For each (f,h) E ~ x l, we define the gain rate 
vector g(f,h) such that g(f,h). represents the long run average expected 
i 
return per unit time when the initial state is i, and policies f,h are 
used. We thus have 






m m ~.(f,h) g (f,h) 
i 
, i E n\R(f ,h) 
Next, we recall that V(r), the value vector of the r-discount game, satis-
fies the equation: 
( 1. 7) 
where = P~!l I e-rt d F~!l(t) ~ O. 
iJ iJ 
k,l( ) m .• r 
iJ 
0 
BEWLEY and KOHLBERG [2] recently showed for the discrete time case (SDG's) 
that V(r) may be expressed as a real fractional power of Puiseux serres 
in r, for all interest rates r that are sufficiently close to O. Mo.re 
specifically, there exists an integer M ~ 1 such that: 
( I • 8) V(r) = ~=-c, }k) -k/M r 
This result carries easily over to the general SRG-case. We henceforth 
assume that P~. ,l(r) and mk_,_l(r) h T 1 . . L ave a ay or series expansion 
iJ 
(i En; k E K(i); l E L(i)): 




proof goes along lines with section 11 in [2]. Note that 
< 1 for all r > 0 and all i En; k E K(i) and l E L(i). 
Observe next, from a standard contraction mapping argument that 
(1.9) the equation xi= val[p~'l(r) +, lj m~jl(r) xj], i En 
has a (unique) solution for all values of the parameters 
pk1,'l(r) and m~!l(r) such that m~!l(r) > 0 and l· m~!l(r) < I. iJ iJ J iJ 
Since (1.9) is a sentence in elementary algebra (cf. cor. 9.2 in [2]) 
it follows from Tarski's principle (cf. section 11 in [2]) that (1.9) 
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is true over any real closed field, if it is true over the reals. 
Finally, the set of all real Puiseux series was shown to be a closed 
ordered field (cf. section 10 in [2]) which completes the proof that V(r) 
has an expansion of the type l~=-oo a(k)r-k/M_ The fact that a(k) = O, for 
all k > M finally follows from the proof of th. 7.2 in [2] and the obser-
vation that 
(I. IO) 
. Tk,,l . ( ) -rt where T. = min. k O i > 0. To verify I.JO note that e s min i, ,,c.. I - ½rt 
for all r sufficiently close to zero, and use the definition of 
m~!l(r). D 
1J 
We recall from the example in section 14 of [2] that in general V(r) 
cannot be expressed as a rational function or Laurent series in r as.is 
known to be the case in ordinary MRP's (cf. [4],[13]). The vector a(M) 
in (1.8) is called the asymptotic average value vector. Finally it was 
shown in [2] that in the discrete-time ease (of SDG's), a(M)= lim v(n)/n 
n-+<» 
where v(n) is the vector, whose i-th component denotes the value of the 
n-step game with initial state i. 
2. THE AVERAGE RETURN CRITERION; A PAIR OF FUNCTIONAL EQUATIONS 
In this section we are concerned with the average return per unit 
time criterion, i.e. we evaluate any pair of (possibly non-stationary) 
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policies for players l and 2, by considering for each initial state i E Q: 
(2. l) g (,n,•1•). = liminfN (E ,,, \'N 1 p ) / (E \'N , ) ,· -'+' 'I' i "?<X) lP,'f' ln= n tp,1/J ln=l n i E Q. 
where pn(,n) denotes the payoff to player l (the length of the period) tn 
between of the n-1-st and then-th observation of state. E indicates 
, lP, 1/J 
the expectation, given the players' policies tp and iµ. A number of equiva-
lent criteria have been formulated in [3]. 
A pair of policies (tp*,iµ*) is called an AEP, if and only if for 
every policy <ID E 41, and 1/J E '¥: 
(2.2) ( *) * * * gllP,1/J . s g(tp ,1/J ). s g(tp ,1/J)., 
i i i 
for all i E Q. 
It is known from GILLETTE [8] that one or both players may fail to have 
gain-optimal policies. For the discrete-time case, the existence of a 
stationary AEP was shown to be guaranteed for every possible combination 
of one-step expected rewards qt•l if the matrix function II(f,h) is conti-
nuous on 4/ x '¥ (cf. [6], section 4). 
Continuity of TI(f,h) on its turn is guaranteed to hold when the 
number of subchains n(f,h) is continuous, i.e. constant on 4/ x IJ:', and a 
(finitely verifiable) sufficient condition for the latter was obtained 
in [6], with respect to the chain structure of the set of pur>e policies. 
Lemma 2-1 shows that these results carry over to the general SRG-case: 
LEMMA 2.1: Let n(f,h) be constant on 41 xiµ. Then there exists a AEP. 
PROOF. Consider the SDG which has Q as state space, K(i) and L(i) as the 
action spaces in i E Q, and the following transition probabilities and 
one-step expected rewards: 
rP~!l = ,/T~'l[P~!,e_ 0 .. J + 0 .. ; i,j E Q, k E K(i), l E L(i). 
iJ i iJ iJ iJ 
(2.3) 
l~u k,l/Tk,l k E K(i), ,e_ E L(i) q.' = q. . ; i E Q, 
i 1 i 
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_ {o if i;, j where o .• - 1 th . an where .• has to be chosen such that 1J o erwise-
0 < ~ • Tk,l/(l Pk,l) • :S min . k o • - • • • 
1, ,-t.. 1 11 
This data-transformation which was first introduced in [16], has the 
property of leaving for every pair of policies (f,h) E -~ x ~, both the chain 
structure (e.g. the number of subchains) and the gain-rate vector unaltered. 
Hence, n(f,h) is constant on~ x ~, in the transformed SDG as well, which 
implies (cf. [6], th •. 3) the existence of a policy pair (f* ,h*) for which 
* * * ~ * g(f,h) :S g(f ,h) :S g(f ,h) for all f E ~, h E ~- Finally one easily con-
cludes that (f*,h*) is an AEP, i.e. an equilibrium pair of policies within 
the largest possible class of policies (cf. e.g. [6]). D 
As a special case for the condition in lemma 2-1, we have that 
stationary AEP exist, if 
(U): every pair of pure stationary policies is unichained. 
In this section, we show that the following pair of optimality equations 
arises when analyzing the average return criterion: 
(2.4) i € n 
(2.5) 1 [ k,l , Hk,l , pk,l J . n vi= va [K(i,g),L(i,g)] qi - lj ij gj+ lj ij vj , 1 E ~h 
where for each i E n, and each solution g* ·-to (2.4),.K(i,g*) and L(i,g*) 
* are the sets of optimal actions in the matrix game in (2.4) with g = g. 
Note from lemma 1-1 that the sets K(i,g) and L(i,g} are.in fact the 
convex hulls of a finite number of extreme points such that the games to 
the right of (2.5) may be interpreted as simple matrix games. Observe 
finally that (2.4) and (2.5) are the natural extension of the well-known 
optimality equations in undiscounted MR.Ps (cf. HOWARD [11], DENARDO and 
FOX [5]). 
We say that a pair of policies (f*,h*) satisfies the optimality 
equations (2.4) and (2.5), if for some solution (g*,v*), (f*(i), h*(i)) 
is an equilibrium pair of actions in the matrix games to the right of 
(2.4) and (2.5). First we show that a solution pair to the equations (2.4) 
and (2.5) exists whenever a stationary AEP exists. Our proof is a 
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constructive one; in fact we show that a certain class of successive 
approximation schemes converges to a solution pair of (2.4) and (2.5) 
whenever a stationary AEP exists. These schemes are the·natural analogue 
of a value iteration method which was introduced and studied by HORDIJK 
and TIJMS [10] for undiscounted MDPs, and a special case of which was first 
used by BATHER [1]. First of all, observe that a(M), the asymptotic average 
value vector (cf. (2.1)) is a solution to (2.4): 
(2.6) 
as is easily verified by inserting (1.10) into both sides of (1.9), multi-
plying the resulting equality by r > 0, letting r tend to zero, and by 
interchanging the limit and value-operation (cf. (1.1)). 
We next consider a related SRG, with n as state space. For each i En, 
k E K(i), l E L(i) let, 
(2. 7) ~kl q., 
l. 
be the associated one-step expected rewards. Both the transition probabi-
lities and the transition time distribution remain unaltered. Moreover 
we restrict in each state i En the set of (randomized) actions available 
for player 1 to K(i,a(M)) and the set of actions for player 2 to L(i,a(M)). 
V(r), a(k)' k =-~, ••• ,Mand for each f E x~=l K(i,a(M)), h E xi L(i,a(M)) 
the quantities q(f,h) and g(f,h) are defined in complete analogy to V(r), 
(k) 
a , k = -~, .•• ,M; q(f,h) and g(f,h). Before introducing the successive 
approximation schemes we first need the following theorem: 
THEOREM 2.2: Assume there exists a stationary AEP (f*,h*) E ~ x fin the 
original stochastic renewal game (SRG). Then 
(a) a(M) = g(f*,h*) 
(b) a(k) = O, k = 1, ... ,M-1 
(c) every policy f E ~ (hEf) which is gain-optimal for player 1 (or 2) 
in the_ origina.Z SRG,. is. gain-optimal- in the transfomzed SRG 
(d) there exists a constant B > 0, and an integer M ~ I, such that for all 
11 
r, s > 0 sufficiently small: 
PROOF. 
(a),(b): go along lines with leIIDD.a 7.11 in [3]: 
Let I!=-oo A (k) r -k [ I!=-oo B (k) r -k] be the Laurent series exp?nsion . 
of w!(r) [W2(r)J, the total discounted return to player I [2] in the 
MRP that results when player 2 [I] ties himself down to policy h*[f*]. 
Since f*[h*] is gain-optimal in this MRP conclude that, A(I) = B(l) = 
= g(f*,h*). Finally, parts (a) and (b) follow from the inequalities 
W2(r) s V(r) S W1(r). 
(c) Fix a stationary AEP (f*,h*) and i en; recall (e.g. from th. I in [5]) 
that for any f e ~ and he,: 
* * * * * * . * * * * * * P(f,h) g(f ,h) s P(f ,h) g(f ,h) = g(f ,h) s P(f ,h) g(f ,h) 
such that: 
P ( f , h *) a ~~1) s P ( f * , h *) a ~M) 
i i 
= a~M) s P(f*,h) a~M), thus proving that 
. i i 
f*(i) e K (i,a(M)) and h*(i) E L (i,a(M)) for all i en, or in other 
words 
show, 
the feasibility off* and h* in the transformed game. We next 
( * *) . . . ~( * *) 0 that f ,h is an AEP in the transformed SRG, with g f ,h = , 
by proving: 
(2.9) ~ * (a) g(f,h) 
(b) g(f* ,h) 
= g(f,-h*) - ·.a (U), for al.l f £ "X. K (i,a (M)) 
i 
= g(f*,h) - a(M), for all he X. L (i,a(M)) 
i 
Confining ourselves to (2.9) (a) (the proof of (b) being analogous) 
fix f e X. K (i,a(M)), and observe by iterating the equality 












* = g(f,h ). -
l. 
m * * . * . (~) = <n (f,h ),q(f,h )-H(f;h )a > 
m * * <n (f,h ),T(f,h )> 
* that ~(f h*). = tn(f,h) 
g ' l. lm= I 
a~M), for all i En. 
(d) The proof of 
. i. (M) 
part (b) shows that a = 0 as well as the existence of 
a stationary AEP in the transformed model, and the latter implies by 
applying part (a) to the transformed game,· that a(k) = 0 fork= 1, ••• ,M-1 
as well i.e. for all r sufficiently small: 
lv(r) ~ a(O)I = rl/M B(r) where B(r) = II~=O a(-k-l) k/MI . r 1.s a 
function which is continuous in r = O. Hence there exists a scalar 
* * B > 0 and a number r > 0 such that for all r < r: 
I~ ( ) ~ ( 0) I I /M . f 11 * V r - a ~ Br , 1..e. or a r, s < r: ~ ~ ~ ~ 
V(r) - V(s) ~ V(r) - a(O) + V(~) - a(O) ~ Brl/M - Bsl/M ~ Blrl/M - SI/Ml D 
We next introduce the following successive approximation scheme: 
(2.10) 
where {rn}00 is a sequence of interest rates, with lim r = 0. 
n=I n-+oo n 
Under the assumption that a stationary AEP exists, the following theorem 
exhibits the existence of a solution pair to the optimality equations (1.4) 
and (1.5) by showing in analogy to th. I in HORDIJK and TIJMS [10] that 
the sequence {y(n)}:=I converges under specific conditions on {rn}00 : 
n=I 
THEOREM 2.3. Assume the original SRG 'has a stationary AEP. Then: 
(a) (a(M) ,a(O)) is a solution pair to the f.e. (2.4) and (2.5) 
(b) Let {rn}00 satisfy the conditions: 
n=I 
(I) (1-ri) ••. (1-r~) ➔ 0, as n ➔ co 
(2) r0J.=2 (1-r') •.. (1-r!) lr!I/M _ r! 1/IMI ➔ o, as n ➔ 00 
n J J J-
where r! = ~r. min. k o T~'l. 
J J 1, ,,t.. 1 
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Then lim y(n) = a(o). 
n-+<x> 
PROOF. 
(a) part (a) follows immediately from part (b) by letting n tend to infinity 
on both sides of (2.10) and by observing that the value of a matrix game 
depends continuously upon its entries (cf. (I.I). 
(b) Note that 




and conclude from (I.I) that ly(n+I) - V(r ).I s 
kl n 1 
(max. k tJ l- m.! (r )). ly(n) - V(r )Is (1-½r .T.) ly(n)- V(r )I 
1, ,~ J 1J ~ .n n n min n 
= (1-r') ly(n) - V(r >I~ for all i En, n n 
where the second inequality was shown in (1.12) to hold for all r n 
sufficiently close to zero, i.e. for 
of theorem 2.2, part (d), we may fix 
all n ~ n0 (say). As a consequence 
an integer n1 ~ n0 such that 
for all m ~ n 1: ~ ~ ~ 
IV(r )- V(r )lsBlr1/M -rl/MI =B'lr'l/M - r'l/MI where B' =(2/T. ) 11~. m+ I m m+ I m m+ 1 m ' min 
We conclude that for all m = 1,2, 
ly(n 1+m) - V(r )I s (1-r' +m) ly(n1+m-I) - V(r' )I n 1+m n 1 n 1+m-1 
+ B, ( l -r, ) I r, 1 /M _ r, 1 /M I 
n 1+m n 1+m n 1+m-1 
and by iterating this .inequality, we finally obtain: 
- V(r )I ~ (1-r' ) ••• (I-r' ) ly(n1) - V(r )I nl+m nl+m nl+J nl 
n +m ~ ~ , l 1 ( I , ) ( I , ) I 1 1 /M , I /MI + B . +I -r +m • • • -r. r. - r. 1 • J=nl nl J J 3-
It follows from part (d) of th. 2.2 that lim V(r ) = a(O) 
n-+<x> n 
which in view of the above inequality enables us to conclude that 
lim y(n)-a(O) = lim y(n) - V(r) = 0. 0 n-+oo n-+<x> n 
~kl redefined by q~,l = k,l (M) T~,l the analysis note that with q.' q. - a. 1 1 1 1 1 
th. 2.2 and th. 2.3 leads just as well to the existence of a solution 
the following pair of f.e., whenever a stationary AEP exists: 
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(2.12) 
(2. 13) 1 [ k,l . Tk,l \ pk,l J vi= va [K(i,g),L(i,g)] 4 i - gi i + lj . ij vj ' i E Q. 
We next observe that conditions (1) and (2) of theorem 2.3, part (b) are 
satisfied for any choice: 
r = n 
n 
-b with O < b s 1 
as has been verified in FEDERGRUEN [7]. 
In addition, 
independent of the 
for all i e: Q, the 
we note that when the asymptotic average value is 
initial state of the system, i.e. when a~M) = <aM> 
l. 
f.e. (2.4) and (2.5), as well as (2.12) and (2.13) 
reduce to the single (vector)-equation: 
(2. 14) * [ k,l * k,l \ k,l *J v. = val q. - <g > T. + l· P .. v. , 
l. l. l. J l.J J 
i E Q 
the discrete-time version of which has been considered in HOFFMAN and 
KARP [9]. In this case, the converg~nce result of part (b) of the prevfouss 
theorem leads to a method for approximating the asymptotic average value by 
lower and upper bounds as well as for finding .=or both players and any£> 0 
stationary policies which are e-optimal with respect to the average return 
criterion (cf. FEDERGRUEN [7]). 
EXAMPLE 1 shows triat whereas the existence of a solution pair to the f.e. 
(2.4) and (2.5) is a necessary condition for the existence of a stationary 
AEP, it may fail to be sufficient: 
EXAMPLE 1: (all k,l T • • = 
l.J 
l; i,j E Q; k E K(i), l E L(i). 
0 
(O,O,l) 0 2 
(0,0,1) 




The notation means that if the players choose the row and 
column corresponding to this box, then player 2 pays player I the amount x 
and the next state is I, with probability a, 2 with probability Band 3 
with probability y = 1-a-B. Take p =¾and verify first that a(M) = [1,0,2]. 
Note that a~M) = 0 and ajM) = 2, and verify that x = I is the unique solu-
tion to the equation: 
(2.14) r } X 21 X = valL0.5 2 oJ 
by distinguishing between the cases x > 1 and x < 1. Finally recall from 
(2.6) that afM) is a solution to (2.14). We next verify that a(M) in 
. * 3 .. * 1* 1* 1 · combination with any vector v EE satisfying v 1 = ~v2 + 2v3 - 2 , is a 
solution pair to (2.4) and (2.5). 
(M) (M) I Note that K(l ,a ) = {[I ,OJ} and L(l ,a ) = {[y1 ,y2 ,y3J y3 = 
such that in this example (2.5) becomes: 
We next verify that there is no stationary AEP in this game. Note that a 
stationary policy for player is completely specified by the probability 
x with which action 1 in state 1 is chosen. Likewise, a stationary policy 
for player 2, is specified by the probability vector (y1,y2 ,y3) with which 
the available actions in state 1 are randomized. 
If X = and Y2 = 1 : g(f,h) 1 = 0 
if X = and Y2 < I : g(f,h) 1 = (yt+2y3)/(y]+y3) 
if X < g(f,h) 1 = (½+½x)y 1+2y2+2~y3 
which shows that no pair of stationary policies is an AEP. 
We conclude that in general, and in contrast to what is known to be the 
case for ordinary MRPs, a policy pair (f*,h*) which satisfies the optimality 
equations (2.4) and (2.5) for some solution pair (g*,v*), does not need to 
be an AEP. 
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Example I, with p =½shows that this may even be the case when stationary 
AEPs do exist: 
* Note that with p = !, g = [1,0,2] satisfies (2.4), by verifying: 
I 27 
2 OJ' 
and conclude that K(I,g*) = {[x,I-xJl½~x~I} and L(I,g*) = {[I,0,0]}. 
The optimality equation (2.5) thus becomes: 
such that g* in combination with any vector v* E E3 satisfying v~ = ½v;+½v;, 
is a solution pair to (2.4) and (2.5). Verify that any pair of policies 
( * * • I * . f , h ) w1. th 2 ~ f I I < * I and h 11 = I is a stationary AEP, whereas the 
only pair of policies which satisfies the optimality equations (2.4) and 
* * * * (2.5) for (g ,v) has fll = I and hll = 1 and 1.s not an AEP. 
Observe finally (by considering the gain rate of one of the AEPs) that 
* (M) g = a . 
We conclude that even when stationary AEPs do exist, such policy pairs 
do not necessarily need to be found within the class of (pairs of) policies 
that satisfy the optimality equations for some solution pair (the existence 
of which follows from th. 2. 3). 
Whereas the above examples illustrate that no full optimality results may 
be obtained for policy pairs that satisfy the optimality equations (2.4) 
and (2.5) for some solution pair (g*,v*), in proposition 2.4 below a 
restricted optimality result 1.s derived. 
* * PROPOSITION 2.4: Let (f ,h) be a policy pair which satisfies the optimality 
equations (2.4) and (2.5) for some solution pair (g*,v*). 
* * * Then g(f ,h) ~ g(f ,h) for all policies h, for which for all 1. E Q. 
(2.15) P(f*,h)g~ => h(i) 1.s an optimal action 1.n the matrix game 
1 
in (2.4); 
with the same restricted optimality result holding for player I, when 
player 2 ties himself down to policy h*. 
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PROOF. Fix a policy h which satisfies (2.15). Recall from the proof of 
part (a) of th. 2.2 that g* is constant on each of the subchains of P(f*,h) 
and conclude that: 
* * * (1) gi s P(f ,h)gi, with 
* * * * * . * (2) v. s q(f ,h). - g. T(f ,h). + P(f ,h)v., for all states i E R(f ,h) 
1 1 1 1 1 
for which (1) holds with strict equality. Apply the proof of lemma 4, 
part (a) in [5] to verify that g* s g(f*,h), with strict equality 
holding for h = h*. 0 
Let in 
which has 1 = 
k k example 1, f (h ), 
k k 
flk = (hlk). Note 
k = 1,2 be the pure policy for player I 
that both for p = I and p = J, (f 1 ,h1) 
satisfies the restricted·optimality·result of prop. 2.4, but fails to be 
an AEP, since O = g(f 1 ,h2) 1 < g(f 1 ,h1)1 = 1. Observe that h2 satisfies 
g* = P(f 1 ,h2)g* but h2 (t) is not an optimal action in the matrix game in 
(2.4). 
(2) 
Finally note that, whereas a stationary AEP doesnot need to satisfy 
both optimality equations (2.4) and.(2.5) for any solution pair (g*,v*) 
(cf. example l with p =½),it will certainly have to satisfy the first 
* (M) f.e. for g = a • 
REMARK. In ordinary MR.P's, a policy f, in order to be maximal gain, needs 
to satisfy the seaond optimality equation (2.5) only in its recurrent states 
(cf. th. 3.1 part (e) of [17]). In the general SDG or SRG model however, we 
couldnot weaken the prerequisite in proposition 2.4, to the assumption: 
(a) (f*(i), h*(i) is an equilibrium pair of actions in the matrix game in 
(2.4) for every i En 
(b) (f*(i), h*(i)) is an equilibrium pair of actions in the matrix game in 
* * (2.5) for every i E R(f ,h) 
even when confining ourselves to the restricted optimality result in prop. 
2.4, as is illustrated by example 2: 
18 
EXAMPLE 2: Consider the SDG-model: 
state 2 
state 
k k Let f (h ); k = 1,2 be defined as above. Take a= O, b = 2, c = 1. Note 
that (£2 ,h 1) is an AEP such that a (M) = [ 1, 1 J and verify that in .this example 
(a(M) ,[0,1]) is a solution pair to (2.4) and (2.5). Note that (f 1 ,h1) satis-
fies (2.4) in every i En, and (2.5) in every i E R(f 1 ,h 1) = {2}; however 
0 = g(f 1 ,h2) 1 < g(f 1 ,h1) 1 = 1 in spite of h2 satisfying condition (2.151 in 
proposition (2.4). 
Prop. 2.4 makes clear that a policy -pair which satisfies (2.4) and (2.5) may 
fail to be an AEP, only when one of the sets K(i,g*) or L(i,g*) (ien) is a 
strict subset of K(i) or L(i). As a consequence no problems arise when the 
asymptotic average value is independent of the initial state of the system: 
(M) 
COROLLARY 2.5. Assume a. 
]_ 
ments are equivalent: 
= <a(M)> for all i En. Then the following state-
(I) a(k) = O, fork= l, ••. ,M-1 
(II) there exists a stationary AEP 
(III) the functional equations (2.4) and (2.5) have a solution pair 
( (M) *) a ,v . 
In addition, under either one of (I), (II) or (III), any policy pair 
which satisfies the funct. eq. (2.4) and (2.5) for some solution pair 
( (M) *) . a ,v in an AEP. 
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PROOF. 
(I) => (II): Consider the SRG, in ~hich merely the one-step expected. 
· . ( ) . ~k,l k,l k,l (M) rewards are tranformed as in 2.7, i.e. q. = q. - T. a . l i i i 
Note that various transformations on p~' (r) imply this 
transformation on the q-f'l = p~'l(O). ~hoose e.g. 
p~'l(r) = p~'l(r) _a(M_ (}:. m~~l(r)-1) (to verify the latter, 
i i r J iJ 
consider the first two terms in the Taylor series expansion 
of m~!l(r)). Finally, subtract a (M) /r from both sides of (Z.. 7) 
iJ . (M) ~kl , kl a<M) 
to obtain: V(r) .-a /r = val[p.' (r)+ lJ. m. ! (r)[V(r)--- ]] , i i . iJ r 
i En and conclude that V(r) = V(r) - a<M)/r; next apply th. 
2.3 
(II) => (I): cf. th. 2.2 part (b) 
(III)=> (II): follows from prop. 2.4, by taking any pair of policies which 
(M) * satisfies the funct. eql: (2.4) and (2.5) for (a ,v ), thus 
proving the last assertion of the corollary, at one blow. D 
REMARK. The implication (III)=> (II) even holds for a denumerable state 
space (cf. e.g. [6], th. 2). Observe that when the asymptotic average value 
does depend upon the initial state of the system, (I) and (II) do not need 
to be equivalent, i.e. (I) may fail to imply (II); as an example take the 
Big Match (cf. [8]) which has even a Laurent series expansion for V(r), 
i.e. which has M = I (cf. [3], section 8). 
3. SOME PROPERTIES OF THE SOLUTION SPACE OF THE OPTIMALITY EQUATIONS 
In this section, we discuss a number of properties of the functional 
equations (2.4) and (2.5) which we will need in the following section. We 
first observe that in general (2.4) and (2.5) may fail to have a solution 
pair, just like there may fail to be (stationary) AEPs. As an example, take 
ex.2 with a= I, b = c = 0, which appeared first in STERN [21] and was used 
in BEWLEY and KOHLBERG ([3], sect. I I). Note from [3], that this example 
has Q as its asymptotic average value vector, but has no stationary AEP 
and apply cor. 2.5 (or alternatively note that in this example M = 2, and 
a(l) = [1,0]; and apply cor. 2.5). 
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Next, whenever a solution pair (g*,v*) exists to the optimality 
equations (2.4) and (2.5), the v*-part of the solution is obviously not 
uniquely determined (note e.g. that if (g*,v*) is a solution pair, then so 
is (g*,v*+cl) for any scalar c; cf. also [17], where a complete characte-
rization of the solution space was given,<for the case of ordinary MRPs). 
In addition, since a pair of policies (f*,h*) which satisfies the optima-
lity equations, does not need to be an AEP, it is still unclear to us 
whether the g*-part is always uniquely determined. All of the above diffi-
culties arise, in view of the chain structure being discontinuous on~ x t 
in the general multichain case. Theorem 3.1 below gives a number of charac-
terizations with respect to the optimality equations, under condition (U). 
Since in the following section, optimality equations of a slightly more 
general structure will appear, we formulate and derive our results with 
respect to the f.e.: 
(3. 1) x. = l A A [ k,l + I- P~!l x. J' i E Q l. va [K(i),L(i)J ai J l.J J 
(3. 2) kl - l- H~~l x. + I- P~!l y.J, i y. = valclc· *) Ic· *j[c.' E S°2 l. 1.,x , 1.,x 1. J l.J J J l.J J 
where for each i En, K(i) and L(i) are closed convex polyhedral su~sets of 
* ~ * ~ * K(i) and L(i), and where for each solution x to (3.1), K(i,x) and L(i,x) 
are the sets of optimal actions in the matrix games in * (3.1) with x = x; 
k,l d k,l . . . (. r. k K(.) o a. an c. are g1.ven quant1.t1.es 1. E ~6, E 1., ~ 
l. l. 
THEOREM 3.1. 
(a) (3.1) has a solution * X , if and only if 
E L(i)). 
(3.3) the SDG with 'q~,l = a~,l has a stationary AEP, and 
l. 1. 
0 as its asyrrrptotic average value vector 
(b) Assume condition (U) to be satisfied. Then if (3.3) holds: 
* (I) The solution x to (3.1) is unique up to a multiple of.!_, such that 
the sets K(i) = K(i,x*) and I(i) = L(i,~*), i En, are uniquely 
determined. 
* * * (2) A solution (x ,y) to (3.1) exists, where x is uniquely determined 
by: 
(3.4) 
1 ~ * o <TI-(f,h),c(f,h)-H(f,h)r > 
x. = x + maxfE:X.K(i(minhEX.L(i) - 2 
]. i ]. ' ]. <TI (f,h),T(f,h)> 
I o 
0 <TI (f,h),c(f,h)-H(f,h)x > 
=xi+ mi~EX.L(i) maxfEX.K(i) 1 
]. ]. <TI (f,h),T(f,h)> 
where x0 denotes some solution to (3.1). Moreover, y* is unique up to 
a muZtipZe of_!_. 
PROOF. 
(a) immediate form corollary 2.5 
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0 1 0 0 1 1 
(b) (1): Let x ,x be two solutions to (3.1) and let (f ,h) and (f ,h) be 
two pairs of policies which satisfy (3.1) for x0 and x 1 resp. Note that: 
"' o 1 ol o I ol ol 1 
v (f h ) P(f h ) d < (f h ) P,(J...c ,h ) x and sub-x ~ a , + , x an x ~ a , + 
tract the second inequality from the first one, in order to obtain: 
x0 - x 1 ~ P(f0 ,h1) [x0 -x1J, and by iterating the latter: 
(3. 5) 
I 
- X >, i € n. 
Similarly, we obtain 
<.,,.(l)(fI,ho), o 1 o 1 " X - X > = C < [x -x ]., 2 - ]. i € Q. 
We finally show c 1 = c2 , which proves part (a). Multiply both sides of 
(1) 0 1 0 1 
(3.5) by TI (f ,h) in order to conclude that x. - x. = c 1, for all 
i E R(f0 ,h1). Similarly w~ obtain x~ - x~ = c2 f~r al~ i E R(f 1 ,h0 ) 
]. ]. 1 0 0 1 
which implies c 1=c2=c, as a consequence of R(f ,h) n R(f ,h) I 0, 
in view of assumption (U). 
(2): Fix a solution x0 to (3.1), and consider the SRG, which has Q 
as its state space, K(i) and L(i) as the sets of (randomized) alterna-
tives available to player 1 and 2 and with one-step expected rewards 
~k,l k,l ' Hk,l o d 1 d . . b b"l" . d q. = c. - l· .. x. an una tere transition pro a 1. 1.ties an 
i ]. J 1.J J 
transition time distributions. Note from lemma 1.1 that each of the 
sets K(i) and L(i) may be considered as the set of randomizations of a 
finite number of (pure) alternatives. This, in combination with condi-
tion (U), implies as a result of lennna 2.1, and cor. 2.5 the existence 
of a solution to the f.e.: 
BIBLIOTHEEK MATHEW.ATiSCH CENTRUM 
--AMSTERDAM--
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where g0 is the asymptotic average value vector in this stochastic game 
with g~ = <g0 >, i E Qin view of our unichainedness-assumption. This 
· 1· i h * 0 o · 1 . (3 2) h h . h . imp ies tat x = x +g is a so ution to • , t us sowing t e exis-
tence of a solution pair to (3.1) and (3.2). We next show that the 
x*-part is uniquely determined, and derive its explicit expression. 
The fact that the y*-part is unique up to a multiple of 1 follows as in 
* * part (b) (1). Let (x ,y) be a solution to (3.1) and (3.2), and let 
(f*,h*) be a policy pair which satisfies (3.1) and (3.2) for (x*,y*). 
* 0 Let g0 = x -x, Then. for each h EX. L(i): 
i 
* * * 0 0 * * * y ~ c(f ,h) - H(f ,h) x - <g > T(f ,h) + P(f ,h)y. 
Multiply this inequality by TI(f*,h) and conclude that: 
I * * * o 
(3.6) o <TI (f ,h),c(f ,h)-H(f ,h)x > g ~--''-~-'-"-''--=--'--''--=----
I * * <TI (f ,h),T(f ,h)> 
with strict equality holding for h = h*. Likewise, one can show that: 
o · I * * * o I * *· g ~ <TI (f,h ), c(f,h ) - H(f,h )x >/< TI (f,h) T(f,h > 
for all "f EX. ~(i), with strict equality for f 
i 
the proof of part (b). D · 
* = f , thus completing 
4. SENSITIVE DISCOUNT AND CUMULATIVE AVERAGE OPTIMALITY. 
In this section, we consider a sequence of increasingly selective 
optimality criteria, which appears as the natural extension to the SRG-model 
of the sensitive discount (or cumulative average) optimality criteria, as 
formulated and studied in Markov Decision Theory (cf. e.g. [4],[13],[22]). 
We call a policy pair(~*,~*) an-discount equilibrium pair of poli-
cies (n-EP) (n = -I ,0, ••. ), if: 
(4. I) -n * * * limsup r [V(~ ,~ )(r) - V(~ ,~)(r)] ~ 0 ~ 
r+O 
where V({J),1/J)(r) denotes the total discounted return to player 1, when the 
players use policies {J),1/J and when the rewards are discounted at rater. 
We restrict our analysis to the sensitive discount criteria for the 
discrete-time case of SDGs, in order to avoid too burdensome a notation. 
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The extension of our results to the general SRG-case, is immediate and the 
analysis of the cumulative average optimality criteria is analogous to the 
one given below, with the same sequence of f.e. associated (note that for 
n = -1, equivalence of the two criteria was proven in BEWLEY and KOHLBERG 
[3]). E.g. whereas in the general SRG-model the expressions in the various 
f.e., to be considered below~- become more complicated functions of the terms 
1.n the expansions of p~',e_(r) and m~!1 (r) (cf. DENARDO [4]), the structure 
1. 1.J 
of eaeh consecutive pair of f. e. is exactly identical to the one of (3. 1) 
and (3. 2). Consider the following sequence of optimality equations: 
(4.2) g. = val[I. P~!,e_ g.J, 1. ea 
1. J 1.J J 
() 1 [ k,l 
x O i = va [K(i,g),L(i,g)J qi (4. 3) - g. + l· P~~,e_ x(O).], 1. J 1.J J i E Q 
(4.4) 
m= J,2, •.. , i E Q 
where X(m) denotes the m+2-tuple of vectors (g,x(O), ... ,x(m)), m = 0,1, ... 
In addition for all m = 1,2, ... and i ea and any solution X(m-1) to the 
first m+l f.e. in (4.2)-(4.4); K(m)(i,X(m-I)) and L(m)(i,(m-1)) denote the 
sets of optimal actions in the m+l-st f.e. 
For each stationary pair of policies (f,h) let: 
(4. 5) 
,oo (k) k 
V(f,h)(r) = g(f,h)/r + lk=O x (f,h)r 
represent the Laurent series expansion of the total discounted return asso-
ciated with (f,h). Finally, if xis a vector, we say xis Z-exicographicaUy 
non-negative written x ~ 0, if the first nonvanishing element of xis posi-
tive. Similarly, xis called lexicographically positive, written x? 0 if 
x>ro and x "'f 0. We write x;/7)y or y{(~)x if x-y~(() 0 
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THEOREM 4. 1 • 
(a) Let (f*,h*) be a stationa;r,y n-EP (n = -1,0, ..• ). Then 
(1) There exists a n+3-tupZe (g*,v , ••• ,x(n+l)) which satisfies (4.2), 
(4.3) and the first n+l f.e. of (4.4). 
(2) In the Puiseux series exp~nsion of V(r), we have: 
for l = -1 
(4. 6) 
forl=O, ••• ,n 
a(-_lM-p) = o 0, for~= -1, ••• ,n; p = 1 , ••• ,M-1 
(b) Let (f*,h~) be a stationary N-EP. Then 
(1) (f*,h*) is a n-EP for all n ~ N 
(2) V(r) has a Laurent series expansion. 
PROOF. 
(a) (1) For n = -1 the th. holds as a consequence of th. 2. 3; hence we ass.ume 
n ~ O. Note that h*(f*) is an-optimal policy in the MDP which.results 
for player 2 (1) when player 1 .(2) ties himself down to policy f* (h *). 
Use th. 4 of [22] to conclude that for all i ea, f e I, he'= 
(4. 7) ~ * * * * * * \ * (0) * * [l.P(f,h ) .. g(f ,h ).;q(f,h ).-g(f ,h ).+l.P(f,h ) .. x (f ,h ). 
J 1.J J 1. 1. J l.J . J.. 
, ... , _ x(n-l)(f*,h*). , ( *) (n)( * *) J + l · p f ,h .. X f ,h . J " , 1. J l.J J 
\ * * * * * * \ * (0) * * [l.P(f ,h) .. g(f ,h ).;q(f ,h).-g(f ,h ).+l.P(f ,h) .. x (f ,h ). 
J l.J J 1. 1. J l.J J 
(n-1) * * , * (n) * * ; •.• ; - x (f ,h ). + l· P(f ,h) .. x (f ,h ).] 
1. J lJ J 
with strict equality holding for h = h*, and f = f*. One easily concludes 
* * (n) * * . that X(n) = [g(f ,h ); .•• ;x (f ,h )] sat1.sfy (4.2), (4.3) and the 
first n f.e •. in (4.4) .. To prove that there exis.ts a solution to the 
n+l-st f.e. in (4.4) as well, note that (f* ,h*) is an AEP in the sto-
chastic game, which has Q as its state space, K(n+l)(i,X(n)) and 
L(n+l)(. X( )) h . . . d . 1., n as t e act1.on spaces 1.n state 1. ea, an w1.th one-step 
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, ~k,l (n) c· * *) d . . b b · 1 · . expected rewards q. = - x f ,h ., an trans1.t1.on pro a 1. 1.t1.es 
l 1. l. 
p~~l = P~! • (cf. e.g. DENARDO '[4], p. 491). Finally note that this 
l.J l.J 
stochastic game has Oas its asymptotic average value vector, and 
apply th. 2.3. 
(2) We prove part (a) (2) by complete induction with respect to l. 
(4.8) 
( -lM) * * (-lM-p) Note that for l = -1, the equalities a = g(f ,h) and a = 0 
( * h*) . . for p = 1, ••• ,M-1 follow from the fact that f, 1.s a stat1.onary 
AEP, using leIIDlla 2.2. Assume that (4.6) holds for all l = -1, ••• ,l*<n. 
Let 
be the Laurent series expansion of w1(r)[W(Z)(r)], the total discounted 
return to player 1 [2] in the MDP that results when player 2 [1] ties 
himself down to policy h*[f*] and note that 
* for all k = O, ..• ,l +1 
in view of f*[h*J being .e.*+1- optimal in this MDP. Observe that, 
w2(r) s V(r) s w1(r), and conclude from (4.8) and the induction assump-
tion that the coefficients of the terms with power strictly less than 
* 1 2 (-l*- 1) (-l*- 1) l +1, in W (r), V(r) and W (r) coincide. Since A = B 
* we conclude that (4.6) holds for l = l +l as well. 
(b) (1): It follows from VEINOTT ([23], p. 1646) that f*[h*], since being 
N-optimal, is n-o~timal for all n ~Nin the MDP that results when 
player 2 [I] ties himself down to policy h*[f*]. 
(b) (2): IIIDllediate from (a) (2) and (b) (1). 0 
We observe that part (b) of th. 4.1 may not be extended to the general 
SRG-model, since it does not even hold in the general MRP-case (cf. [4], 
p. 489). However, part (b) generalizes proportion 6.4 in [3], where it was 
shown that V(r) has a Laurent series expansion, if there exists a uniformly 
discount optimal pair of policies, i.e. a pair (f*,h*) which is optimal in 
the r-discount game for all r > 0 sufficiently small. We next observe, that 
whereas the existence of a solution to the first n+I f.e. in (4.1) is a 
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necessary condition for the existenc·e of a stationary n-EP, it certainly 
may fail to be sufficient, as was pointed out for the case n = -1, in 
section 2. 
In analogy to prop. 2.4, the following partiaZ.1optimality result' 
may be obtained for any policy pair which satisfies (4.2),(4.3) and the 
first n+l f.e. in (4.4) for some solution (g*,x*(o), ••• ,x*(n+l)): 
PROPOSITION 4.2. Fix n = -1,0, •..• Let (g*,x*(O), ••• ,x*(n+l)) be a solution 
to (4.2),(4.3) and the first n+I f.e. of (4.3), and let (f*,h*) E ~ x W be 
a policy pair which satisfies these optimality equations for this solution. 
Then 
* * (0) * * (n) * * · J * (n) * [g(f ,h ).;x (f ,h ).; ••• ;x (f ,h ).J;;.,[g(f ,h).; ... ;x (f ,h).J 
1 1 1 1 1 
holds in every i' En, for those policies h for which: 
(4.9) l· P(f*,h) .. g~ = g~ => h(i) E L(i,g*) 
J 1] J 1 
{h(i) EL(m)(l,X{m-1)) and -x*.(m-l) + l · P(f* ,h) .. x~(m~h(i) E L (m+l) (i,x* (m) ), 
1 J 1J J 
1 s ms n+l 
with the same restricted optimality result holding for policy f*. □ 
We finally turn to the case where condition (U) is satisfied: 
THEOREM 4.3. Assume condition (U) holds. Then 
(a) there exists a solution to the entire sequence of f.e. (4.2),(4.3) and 
(4.4). 
(b) Fix n = 0,1, ••.• In the solution (g*,x*(o), ••• x*(n)) to (4.2),(4.3) 
;• * * . and the first n f.e. of (4.4), we ha.ve (g ,x (O), ••• ,x (n-1)) un~quely 
determined (explicit expressions of which may be obtained by a repeated 
application of th. 3.1), whereas x*(n) is unique up to a multiple of.!_. 
PROOF. Part (a) follows from part (b), and part (b) is proven by complete 
induction with respect ton. Note that for n = O, the assertion follows as 
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a special case of th. 3.1. Assume, it holds for some n = 0,1, ... , We 
* * then have in particular that x (n-1) (or g when n = O) is uniquely deter-
mined and that the f.e.: 
(4.10) 
i E Q 
(or (4.3) in case n = 0) has a solution. Apply th. 3.1 to the combination 
of (4.10) (or (4.3) in case n = O) and the n+l~st f.e. in (4.4), to verify 
that the assertion holds for n+l as well. D 
In SOBEL ([20], th. 2), it was asserted that a stationary 1-EP always 
exists under condition (U). In [6] we pointed out that the proof of this 
theorem is incorrect, and the next example shows that the asserted result 
itself may fail to hold: 
EXAMPLE 3: 
2 
(O, l) ( 1 , O) 
~ -1 3 
(0,1) state 2 
state l 
Note that g(f,h) = (5xy-2x-4y+3)/(2+2xy-x-y) where x = f 11 and y = h 11 . 
*1 * *I* 1 · Conclude that {f f 11 = I} and {h h 11 ~ 3} are the sets of optimal 
(stationary) polices for players 1 and 2, with respect to the average 
return per unit time criterion. Note however that none of these policy 
. . 1 EP . x(O)(f*,h) = 0 h h O h x(O)(f*,h*) 1 pairs is - since wen 11 = , w ereas 
for all policies h* which are gain optimal for player 2. 
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